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Jonathan Dean*
The Post-Cold War Security System in
Europe-An Evaluation
The November 1990 summit meeting in Paris of the heads of govern-
ment of the thirty-four countries participating in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe' ("the CSCE") is one of the central
points of this symposium. It is right to focus on the Paris meeting. It
was a landmark event in arms control which took the decisive steps
toward establishing a new post-Cold War security system.
The summit participants signed the Treaty on Conventional Forces
in Europe 2 ("CFE Treaty"). When implemented, this treaty will elimi-
nate the large numerical superiority in major conventional armaments of
the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. The summit leaders approved
a series of confidence-building measures which increase the predictabil-
ity and accessibility to mutual observation of the military activities, the
military structures, and the defense budgets of member states. The
summit also established several standing CSCE institutions designed for
conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
Together with a European Community3 of growing capability, a
continuing NATO alliance 4 , and the Two Plus Four Treaty on German
* Arms Control Advisor, Union of Concerned Scientists. During the 1950s,
Ambassador Dean served in Bonn as liaison officer between the U.S. High
Commission and the newly formed government of the German Federal Republic.
Following appointments in Prague and Katanga and service in the State Department,
he returned to Bonn in 1968 in the role of political counselor and deputy U.S.
representative in the negotiations that led to the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin.
Beginning in 1973, Ambassador Dean served as deputy head of the U.S. delegation
to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in Vienna, and from 1978-
1981 he was head of the delegation. From 1982-1984, he worked on European
security and arms control issues at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
1. Conference on Security & Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
73 DEvT. OF ST. BULL. 323 (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
2. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Paris, Nov. 1990, reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 1 (1991) [hereinafter CFE Treaty].
3. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of
Rome), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
4. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 14, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
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unification, 5 these summit decisions provide the enduring framework
for the new post-Cold War European security system. These compo-
nents are neither redundant nor overlapping, as some have described
them, but they have separate, specialized functions.
In this address, I will describe the principal components of this new
security regime and I will evaluate its capacity to meet the challenges
with which it may be faced.
To jump ahead, my main conclusion is that the new European
security system has good prospects of preventing interstate conflict in
Europe over the coming decade, but that the new system in its totality-
European Community, NATO, and CSCE acting together-will be
needed to meet these challenges. Thejob cannot be done by any single
component alone. Moreover, I doubt the capacity of the new system to
cope successfully with internal violence within a European state, like
Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union.
Let me begin by describing the components of the new European
security system and their functions.
I. The European Community
The widening, step-by-step economic interlinking of the states of West-
ern and Eastern Europe and the promotion of effective democratic sys-
tems in all European states, especially in the Soviet Union, are beyond
doubt the best long-term guarantees for security in Europe. Conse-
quently, the European Community, as the core of integrative dynamism
in Europe, will be the main component and foundation of the new Euro-
pean security system.
A debate is underway over whether functioning democracies can
make war on each other, in other words, whether consolidation of effec-
tive democracy in the USSR would definitely end all possibility of con-
flict with Western states. That debate remains unresolved.
But no one disputes that policy-making in democracies is more
transparent, and therefore more predictable, than in autocratic systems;
that political power in democracies is more dispersed, with barriers
against the sudden, arbitrary decisions characteristic of autocratic gov-
ernment; and that the proven capacity of democratic systems to resolve
internal conflicts peacefully reduces the likelihood of large-scale domes-
tic violence which may have international consequences. Domestic dis-
turbances will therefore be less threatening under democratic
governments than under authoritarian systems. As we have recently
seen in the Soviet Union, in autocratic systems, the potential for vio-
lence of this kind may grow even while it is repressed.
It is also not contested that democracies are generally readier to
participate in international cooperation, including cooperation for
5. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Moscow, Sept. 12,
1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990) [hereinafter Two Plus Four Treaty].
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peacekeeping. Consequently, it is very much in the common Western
interest to support democratic institutions in the USSR.
Programs of political and economic integration and cooperation
managed by the European Community will therefore provide the main
positive component of the new European security system. And mea-
sures to deny the economic benefits of the Community will be among
the most important armaments in the arsenal of the new security system.
Because we will be evaluating the effectiveness of each of these
components as we go along, it is necessary to say here that the capacity
of the European Community to cooperate and to reach common deci-
sions on foreign policy and security issues is still weak.
The European Community was able to decide rapidly to suspend
emergency economic aid to the Soviet Union after Soviet authorities
used violence in Lithuania and Latvia, 6 and the Community also rapidly
restored this help once it was satisfied that violence had stopped. 7 But
the Community was so widely divided on the Persian Gulf crisis after the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 that Great Britain might have seceded
from the EC had plans for majority voting on foreign policy issues
within the Community already been in effect. 8 This point underlines the
fact that the European Community has no armed forces to back its deci-
sions and at this stage probably could not unite on directing these forces
if it had them.
A potential weakness of the European Community is that, should
the united Germany prove to be diplomatically less skillful than West
Germany has been during the past forty years, anti-German and pro-
German coalitions could form within the European Community, para-
lyzing its capacity to act. It is also possible that the European Commu-
nity will not be able to devote sufficient resources to sustain at least
some political and economic headway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
II. The CFE Treaty
The first achievement of the second component of the new European
system, the CFE Treaty, is to eliminate, for both sides, any realistic fear
of surprise attack. This will be achieved by cutting the large superiority
of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact in major conventional arma-
6. See Baltic Assaults Lead Europeans to Hold Off Aid, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1991, at
A1, col. 1; European Parliament Holds up Soviet Food Aid, Wash. Post, Jan. 23, 1991, at
A12.
7. See EC Approves Aid to Soviets Despite Concern Over Ballics, Christian Sci. Monitor,
Feb. 21, 1991, at 5; EC Agrees to Restore Soviet Food Aid, L.A. Times, March 5, 1991, at
A4.
8. See EC Leaving Diplomacy to U.S., Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1991, at A27; Europe Dis-
united in Gulf Response: Community's Integration Moves Could Stumble on Security Issue,
Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1991, at A6; Confrontation in the Gulf. Europe's Statement Urging
Total Pullout, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at 1:5, col. 1; Some European States More Open to
Negotiated Settlement in Guf" Few Are Said to Agree with U.S. on When to Use Military Force,
Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1991, at A19.
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ments to a new level below that of the numerically weaker NATO allies, 9
by placing remaining arms of the type reduced under no-increase ceil-
ings, 10 and by checking compliance with those ceilings by means of an
extensive verification system." 1
Soviet forces are being withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe
by separate agreements reached outside the CFE Treaty. However, the
benefit of the Treaty for the NATO states and for their western neigh-
bors is a reduction of the major conventional armaments of Soviet forces
west of the Urals by more than sixty-five percent below their 1989 levels.
This is far below what could have remained if Soviet forces had merely
been withdrawn from Eastern Europe and redeployed in complete units
in the western USSR. By its own account, the Soviet Union had over
41,000 tanks west of the Urals in 1989; when CFE is implemented, it will
have only about 13,000 tanks. 12 There will be similar reductions of
artillery and armored combat vehicles, attack helicopters and combat
aircraft. 13
Because many thousands of Soviet armaments have been moved out
of the western USSR to beyond the Urals, outside the CFE reduction
area-nearly 60,000 pieces, even by Soviet accounts-far fewer Soviet
armaments will be destroyed under CFE than Western governments had
foreseen.
The bulk of Soviet equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals, how-
ever, will not be in the hands of active duty units; rather, it will be
stored, much of it in the open. In practice, the Soviet Union will proba-
bly disband a large number of the units which it is withdrawing from
Central and Eastern Europe, although it is not required to do so.
Therefore, to be used, the equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals
would not only have to be rehabilitated, but moved west, and new units
would have to be formed to use it, a time-consuming process.
A further benefit of the CFE treaty is its system of verifying residual
limits on reduced arms through exchange of detailed information and
on-site inspection on the ground.14 It has been agreed in principle that
there will also be a regime of air inspection whose details are to be
worked out in the follow-on talks ("CFE IA"), 15 which began early in
1991. The follow-on talks were suspended in the spring of 1991
because of disagreement over resubordination of three Soviet motorized
rifle divisions to the Navy, an action which could have placed at risk rati-
fication of the CFE Treaty by the United States, but resumed after the
dispute was resolved in June. 16
9. CFE Treaty, supra note 2, at Preamble.
10. Id. at arts. IV-VIII.
I1. Id. at arts. XIII-XV.
12. Id. at art. VI.
13. Id.
14. Id. at arts. XIII-XV.
15. See id. at art. XVIII.
16. See McIntyre, Conventional Arms Talks Deadlocked, Reuters, Mar. 21, 1991,
LEXIS (NEXIS library, CRRNT file).
460 Vol 24
1991 Post-Cold War Security in Europe
Assuming that the CFE Treaty will ultimately be ratified and imple-
mented, these residual limits, constraints, and verification measures will
together provide reasonable assurance that Soviet forces west of the
Urals do not grow. Violation of these measures by some future Soviet
government would give the Western countries considerable advance
warning that a Soviet military buildup is pending-perhaps up to two
years. A breakout like this is improbable under the Gorbachev govern-
ment, but it cannot be excluded for the future.
The confused, unstable domestic situation in the USSR may con-
tinue for many years. Without CFE's objective criteria and standards for
measuring Soviet military actions, and verification of those standards,
there could be great uncertainty in the Western countries about Soviet
military behavior. The Soviet Union receives equal benefits from the
CFE Treaty as regards the future strength and behavior of NATO
forces. Among other things, these measures, plus the restriction on the
size of German armed forces and the prohibition of chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons to Germany in the Two Plus Four Treaty, 17 as well
as Germany's continued membership in NATO will provide ongoing
assurance that German armed forces are not a threat.
If uncertainty and doubts about the military posture of the two main
European powers, Germany and the Soviet Union, were to continue,
these concerns could be highly disruptive of political and economic
cooperation in Europe.
Arms control will here perform its classic function of providing the
mutual confidence which is the essential foundation for the positive
work of promoting economic and political integration.
m. Future Action in CFE
The benefits of the CFE Treaty outweigh its shortcomings, but the CFE
Treaty does have a number of defects. Among them are: (1) absence of
negotiated manpower reductions and ceilings; (2) no reductions or
residual ceilings on force structure-too many weapons are left, even
after Treaty cuts, for real stability; (3) no cuts in logistics and force pro-
jection equipment; (4) no controls on production within the reduction
area of treaty limited armaments; (5) no coverage of Soviet forces
beyond the Urals; and (6) a verification regime which could be stronger.
As the cumulative result of these defects, there are no effective limita-
tions in the Treaty on reserves and force generation capability.
Because I spoke in detail on the CFE Treaty here at Cornell earlier
in the week,18 I will comment now only on one of these points. To
achieve the second agreed goal of CFE, eliminating the capability for
initiating large-scale offensives, 19 the scope of negotiated reductions
17. See Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 5.
18. Dean, Achievements and Agenda of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, Remarks at
Symposium at Cornell University (Mar. 5, 1991).
19. CFE Treaty, supra note 2, Preamble.
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should be expanded in future talks to include deep cuts in equipment
essential to long-range forward movement of forces. This equipment,
when combined with a high proportion of penetration or outreach
weapons, like tanks or aircraft, creates offensive capability. Such sup-
port equipment includes mobile, armored anti-aircraft weapons; equip-
ment and units for transporting tanks, munitions, and vehicle fuel;
mobile field hospitals; pipe-laying equipment for vehicle fuel; and pre-
fabricated bridging equipment. Substitutes for equipment like this can
be found for defensive purposes, for example, anti-aircraft weapons of
limited mobility; fixed, buried pipelines; dispersed, small ammunition
depots; and fixed medical installations; but there are no substitutes for
equipment assisting mobility for offensive use.
It is to be hoped that all of these shortcomings of the CFE Treaty
will be taken up in future negotiations, although short-term prospects
for doing so are not good.
IV. The Regime of Confidence and Security Building Measures
Participants in the November 1990 Paris summit meeting also approved
several Confidence and Security Building Measures ("CSBM's") which
greatly extend the regime of prenotification and observation of military
activities contained in the Stockholm Document of September 1986.20
The Stockholm regime of confidence-building measures applies not
only to the armed forces of all members of NATO and the former War-
saw Pact, but also to the twelve neutral and non-aligned states of
Europe. That these measures were negotiated separately from the CFE
Treaty is only a political accident of the Cold War. The essence of the
confidence-building measures in the Stockholm document, in successful
operation since the beginning of 1987, has been to require advance
notice in an annual calendar of all scheduled out-of-garrison ground
force and associated air force activities over a certain size,2 1 observation
of these activities by military officers of other CSCE countries, 22 and a
limited number of on-site inspections of undeclared military activities in
order to assure that their size is in fact below the required threshold of
notification.23
The objective of these measures is to make major ground force
activities predictable and open to observation and thus to avoid surprise
force concentrations, to make it difficult to use field exercises as a source
of political pressure, and to avoid miscalculation of the significance of
field activities that could lead to overreaction by commanders of other
forces in the area.
20. Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe (CDE): Final Stockholm Document, Sept. 19, 1986, reprinted in 26
I.L.M. 190 (1987) [hereinafter Stockholm Document].
21. Stockholm Document, supra note 20, at 29-37.
22. Id. at 38-54.
23. Id. at 63-104.
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The Paris summit approved an important expansion of the existing
confidence-building regime. Some of the new measures improve condi-
tions for observation of exercises and for on-site inspections. 24 How-
ever, a major defect of the post-summit CSBM regime is the continued
exclusion from prenotification of alert exercises of any size and their
exclusion from observation until they have been underway for seventy-
two hours.2 5 This frustrates the objective of avoiding sudden force con-
centrations. At a minimum, any regime of CSBM's based on prenotifica-
tion should cover alerts by restricting their number to a low annual
figure. Further, the summit both failed to lower the numerical levels at
which notification and observation would be obligatory and to increase
the number of inspections for this pre-announcement regime.
One of the new confidence-building measures approved at Paris
provides for large-scale exchange of data on the armed forces of all par-
ticipants and for evaluation of this data by a limited number of on-site
inspections called "evaluation visits." A second measure calls for
annual exchange of information on plans for changes in deployment of
major weapons and equipment systems. A third establishes a common
communications network among CSCE participants.
An especially important new measure provides for exchange of
defense budgets, with provision for annual discussions of these budgets
by all CSCE participants. If in the future the data exchanged is consid-
erably more detailed than the UN format now prescribed, this measure
could, for example, allow early discussion of innovative major weapons
systems well in advance of their deployment. The summit meeting also
decided on a measure establishing procedures for clarifying the nature
of unusual military activities through obligatory written replies to ques-
tions, bilateral meetings with the initiating state, or summoning a meet-
ing of officials of all CSCE governments to discuss the activity.
All of these confidence-building measures, as well as the main pro-
visions of the CFE Treaty, have potential application outside of Europe,
as in the Persian Gulf. This is one important reason why the decisions of
the Paris summit were significant.
V. CSCE Institutions
The Paris summit meeting also decided to establish a number of stand-
ing institutions in the security field,26 including yearly meetings of for-
eign ministers, establishment of a permanent secretariat, and
establishment of a Conflict Prevention Center. This Center, located in
Vienna under general supervision of the confidence-building negotia-
24. See Vienna Document 1990, CSCE/WV.14; Charter of Paris for a New
Europe, Paris, Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 193 (1991) [hereinafter Charter of
Paris].
25. See Stockholm Document, supra note 20, at 54 (exclusion of observation
until 72 hours).
26. Charter of Paris, supra note 24, New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE
Process.
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tors, has responsibility for coordinating the annual exchange of informa-
tion on armed forces and the operation of all confidence-building
measures, 2 7 including the measure on unusual military activities. 2 8
Many European countries wanted considerably wider scope for
these new CSCE institutions, for example, placing at the head of the
Center for Prevention of Conflict a secretary general with authority to
initiate action and giving the Center responsibility for coordinating
between East and West verification of all arms control agreements
affecting Europe, including the CFE Treaty. It was not possible to reach
agreement on these expanded functions at Paris, but it is clear that the
CSCE system will to some extent expand over time. Some plausible and
desirable areas of CSCE expansion which I see are in fact finding and
limiting sales of conventional arms to third world countries.
Some advocates of an expanded CSCE, among them, the Soviet
Union and some Eastern European states, would also like the CSCE to
develop in the long-term into a supranational security organization
assuring European security with forces of its own and integrating both
NATO and former Warsaw Pact forces under a single command. That
development is far off. Even though a single security organization for
Europe would be more efficient than the multiple components of the
new security system, the single organization is more likely to be an
expanded European Community than anything else, and it will be long
before the EC can take over the security function on its own.
Within the framework of the new European security system, the
present CSCE institutions can make a valuable contribution to conflict
resolution. However, the firmly held CSCE requirement for consensus
among all member governments is an important limitation on the capa-
bility of the CSCE to act effectively. It means in practice that the CSCE
cannot take joint action against an offending member state, even a small
one, if the latter disagrees.
VI. Continuing Role of NATO
The NATO alliance will have a vital continuing role in European
security.
In the new situation, NATO will have a series of missions: (I) to
plan the defense strategy and force structure of member states and to
coordinate their arms control activities; (2) to coordinate and evaluate
the success of their policies toward the USSR; (3) to provide assurance
of the successful integration of a united Germany into the European sys-
tem; (4) to provide reassurance to the Eastern European states of their
continued independence vis-A-vis the USSR-even a changed, less coop-
erative Soviet leadership would know in advance that aggressive actions
toward Eastern European states could ultimately involve NATO; (5) to
act as a barrier against the spread or escalation of possible conflict
27. Id.
28. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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originating in Eastern Europe or in the USSR itself;29 (6) to support the
CSCE, coordinating at least loosely the policy of NATO members
toward CSCE activities in the security field and, by its existence as a
force, lending additional weight to CSCE decisions; and (7) in the long
term, to secure its own evolution into a European Defense Community,
the military arm of interested members of the European Community.
Perhaps this evolution can best be assured through the development of
the Western European Union (WEU).3 0
It seems to me, especially given recent unsettling developments in
the Soviet Union, that there is broad support in Europe and in the
United States for the continuation of NATO and the presence of Ameri-
can forces in Europe, and that earlier doubts about this subject have
largely been resolved.
Friction in the evolving relationship among NATO, the WEU, and
the European Community is one of the areas of potential weakness in
the new European Security System. There does not yet seem to be suffi-
cient consensus on this subject to make these components work
together effectively. Nonetheless, the governments concerned have
shown themselves sufficiently pragmatic to cooperate adequately even
without consensus about the future. NATO also lacks the capability for
the disinterested mediation and conciliation that the CSCE has.
VII. Challenges to the New European Security System
Thus far, I have described the components of the new European security
system, the agreed measures contained in the CFE Treaty and in the
regime of Confidence and Security Building Measures, and the institu-
tions which will play a major role in European security-the European
Community, the NATO alliance, and the permanent institutions of the
CSCE.
It is appropriate now to take a quick look at the challenges to Euro-
pean security which have emerged or may shortly emerge, and to ask-
how successful will the new system be in coping with them?
As Western defense authorities see it, even after the CFE Treaty
and the START Treaty3 l on reducing strategic nuclear forces are imple-
mented, the Soviet Union will remain the strongest single military power
of Europe and its only nuclear superpower. Accordingly, the USSR
retains the very substantial capacity, if not the intention, to use its armed
forces for political intimidation or even aggression. The Soviet Union
remains an unstable system, where radical change of policy by decision
of the rulers or by political coup is possible. Domestic violence in the
29. In my view, this function should include deployment of a limited nuclear
force to deter use of nuclear weapons in a potentially chaotic situation in the Soviet
Union.
30. Western European Union Treaty, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 342.
31. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. See generally Jacobson, The Crisis in Arms Con-
trol, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1588, 1600 (explaining outgrowth of START from the SALT
talks in 1987).
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Soviet Union could increase and suddenly turn outward, either in cross-
border violence to the West, or in some attempt by a group struggling
for domination to gain control over nuclear arms and to threaten their
use in support of its own aims.
Here in the United States, our dominant interest with regard to the
Soviet Union is to assure against the use of nuclear weapons against our
country in any circumstances. Aside from these risks, domestic violence
inside the Soviet Union could result in acute misery and large numbers
of refugees moving West. Especially if the Soviet Union seems to be
collapsing, there could be territorial claims against it and tension or
even conflict on that subject. Every single neighbor of the Soviet Union
in the West and East has such claims. There are minority problems in
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and also in
Turkey and Greece. In theory, one or more of these issues could result
in interstate conflict.
Economic conditions in Eastern Europe could also create populist,
nationalist, authoritarian regimes, adding to tension and prompting
large numbers of illegal migrants to move westward. Among the most
immediate and serious problems in Europe is the dissolution of the
Yugoslav Federation, and its descent into civil war with heavy loss of life.
Thirty miles across from Gibraltar, we find the North African
Maghreb, 32 where increasing birthrate, decreasing levels of economic
progress, mounting Islamic radicalism, and the accessibility of modem
missile technology have convinced the Europeans that they face serious
new problems in the future.
How will the European Security System deal with these issues? The
mechanisms available to the CSCE states to deal with interstate dis-
putes-mediation, arbitration, conciliation, and even the use of the
armed forces of some CSCE states to separate the forces of potential
combatants, if both sides agree-are a first line of defense that can help
damp down violence in Europe. The CSCE apparatus may also be suc-
cessful in reducing international frictions over developments inside
member states which have the potential to lead to interstate conflict,
such as treatment of minority groups, through informally bringing to
bear the combined political and economic weight and public opinion of
other members against the offending state or states-especially if those
states are the smaller member states of the CSCE.
However, the CSCE is unlikely to be able to act effectively if there is
no consensus among member states, and it is wholly unable to act if
there is disagreement among its larger member states. It is doubtful
whether the CSCE as such will be strong enough to cope with the disso-
lution of Yugoslavia or to intervene to stop large scale bloodshed there
if the Yugoslav government does not wish to cooperate. It is most
improbable too that CSCE could or would intervene on the side of the
32. "Maghreb" refers generally to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and sometimes
Libya.
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central government or of republic governments in the USSR in the
event of conflict between Soviet republics and the central government,
or between constituent republics, or in the event of anarchic conflict by
armed groups. Here, among other things, economic pressures from the
European Community and the United States are likely to have more
effect.
Conclusion
The most immediate security problems of Europe are not preventing
armed conflict between the European states-but in dealing with the
potential sources of conflict inside member states. This is a far more dif-
ficult task than trying to cope with tensions between European states.
Let me emphasize that the defects and weaknesses which I ascribe
to the European Community, to the CFE Treaty, and to the institutions
of the CSCE are in each case less significant than their positive virtues.
But the weaknesses exist. Therefore, it will probably take the combined
efforts of all of the components of the new European security system-
the European Community, NATO, and the CSCE-to achieve any real
damping of organized violence inside European states.
The fact is that none of these components-the European Commu-
nity, NATO, the CSBM regime, or CSCE institutions-can do this job
on its own. Even by pooling their specialized capabilities, they probably
can achieve only modest success. This argues for better organized liai-
son among them than now exists.
At the same time, I believe it is fair to conclude that, despite these
uncertainties about its capacity to cope early on with the possible seeds
of conflict inside member states, the new European security system is
likely to be successful during the coming decade in its main objective of
preventing interstate conflict in Europe. But here too, it will take effec-
tive cooperation among the component parts: CFE verification and
CSCE confidence-building measures supplying information about mili-
tary activities of all states; active efforts by the CSCE institutions to take
the edge off interstate frictions; possible action by the European Com-
munity to extend or to withdraw credits, to expand trade, or to threaten
to restrict it; member countries using all their bilateral influence; and
NATO in the background to deter violence, and in the last instance,
acting to assure protection of its member states and to anchor the whole
system.
It is clear that this new post-Cold War European security is more
complicated and has many more parts than the stark, simple confronta-
tion of the Cold War.
Are we regressing? No. The new security system will be fulfilling
its function of preventing conflict in Europe without the same risks of
all-out conventional and nuclear war, and without the vast human costs
of repression in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which character-
ized the old Cold War system.
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Moreover, with its combination of armed forces within arms control
limits, and with mechanisms for assuring transparency and conflict pre-
vention, the new European security system represents a sensible way of
obtaining increased security at lower cost. For this reason and because
both the positive and negative aspects of the European experience have
much weight elsewhere in the world, the main elements of the European
system will in time have a valuable multiplier effect by being applied in
many countries throughout the world.
